

# 2021 | INSS Research Report

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## The Summaries

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## A Study on the Maintenance and Development of the ‘9.19 Military Agreement’

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Ko Jaehong

The ‘9.19 Military Agreement’ signed between the two Koreas in September 2018 will be a decisive factor in predicting the future of inter-Korean relations. This article explores how the ‘9.19 Military Agreement’ can be maintained and developed. Since the signing of the Armistice Agreement in 1953, the system of deterrence of war on the Korean Peninsula has shown limitations in preventing various types of war, such as accidental armed conflict between the two Koreas, except for a second planned all-out war. Therefore, the need for a military agreement has been raised between the two Koreas. Since Kim Jong-un took power, North Korea has changed its perception of the issue of accidental armed conflict, which was not recognized in the past. In addition, Kim Jong-un’s military move showed a nuclear development move and a avoidance of accidental armed conflict. This was the background of North Korea’s ‘9.19 Military Agreement’. Since then, North Korea has had advantages in the “9.19 Military Agreement” of easing pressure on North Korea by the ROK-US coalition, focusing on internal economic policy, and utilizing means for political purposes. In addition, North Korea is showing a preference for maintaining the current level of the “9.19 Military Agreement.” Therefore, first of all, it is important to maintain the ‘9.19 Military Agreement’. Then it will be necessary to pursue its development.

Keywords: ‘9.19 Military Agreement’, accidental armed conflict,  
Kim Jong Un, inter-Korean relations,  
the system of deterrence of war on the Korean Peninsula

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## Transatlantic Relations under the Biden Administration Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation

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Kim, Kyoung-Sook

The study suggests that the U.S. policy toward EU under the Biden administration is the top priority for the U.S.-led liberal hegemony. President Biden has pursued America's traditional diplomacy, including restoring and strengthening America's Lead Again, and rebuilding the alliance which proceeded in the perspective of liberal global order. If Trump administration had pursued 'America First' foreign policy, Biden's foreign policy puts first on 'American middle class'. While foreign policy under the Biden administration is expected to depart from some of the key tenets of president Trump's foreign policy, experts also point to a high possibility of continuity in areas such as trade and relations with China. However, on climate change, multilateral cooperation and support for NATO, expectations are highly regarding a potential return to deep levels of transatlantic consensus and cooperation. For the European Union, the impact of Biden on US foreign policy will leave a substantial mark on the future course of transatlantic relations and of global cooperation. As an alliance, the value of freedom and democracy provides a good foundation, but the interests between U.S. and the EU are not always converging. The relationship between the U.S. and the EU is literally the 'bitter competitors placed by fate in the same boat'. Prospect for the U.S.-EU relationship will improve in the Biden Administration era that stresses the recovery of ties with the alliance. However, it is expected that inherent structural vulnerability of U.S.-EU will lead to reinforce the EU's strategic autonomy via EU initiatives. European Union case is likely to be a good example to predict the U.S.-ROK relationship. It is necessary to establish diplomatic identity and manage risks based on the Korea-U.S. alliance so that national interests are not undermined by the U.S.-China strategic competition

Keywords: Transatlantic alliance, liberal hegemony, Biden, EU, China, Conflict of Interest

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## The Changes in Nuclear Development Strategies of North Korea (1948-2017)

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Kim, Bomi

This study examines the internal and external conditions that North Korea pursued to develop nuclear weapons successfully from the establishment of its regime to the declaration of completion of the state nuclear force in November 2017. Despite the prolonged possession of the nuclear program and the growing influence of nuclear weapons on military strategies, discussions on North Korea's strategy in developing nuclear weapons have not been actively conducted. It can be said that nuclear weapons occupy an almost absolute proportion of the military power in Kim Jong Un regime. This study examines how the regime succeeded in securing nuclear weapons and continued to enhance its nuclear capabilities, especially how it responded and utilized various factors such as the security environment, domestic political demands, nuclear technology and material support. The biggest reason for North Korea's success in developing nuclear weapons was its relationships with China and Russia, and the nuclear development strategy that Pyongyang pursued in accordance with the internal and external environment at different times. Rather than consistently pursuing any one strategy in the process of developing nuclear weapons, Pyongyang took different strategies in consideration of the external environment and domestic constraints, and sometimes used several strategies simultaneously according to the external threats and domestic politics. In this process, the presence of China and Russia was meaningful enough to help North Korea strengthening nuclear capabilities without being destroyed by the United States. North Korea is expected to strengthen and sustain its nuclear capabilities in the future to solidify its status as a nuclear power and maintain its deterrence level against the U.S. and South Korea, and flexibly utilize its strategy for nuclear weapons development despite the flow of the U.S.-China strategic competition.

Keywords: North Korea, nuclear weapons, Kim Jong Un, nuclear strategy, hedging

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## COVID-19 and Derogations from Human Rights Treaties

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Kim, Sangkul

The national emergency situations caused by the outbreak of COVID-19 have compelled governments all over the world to impose various measures restricting the liberty and freedom of their citizens. Those measures significantly restrained the right to movement, the right to assembly, the right to privacy, the right to property, the right to education etc, which constitute or tend to constitute violations of international or regional human rights treaty obligations. In this context, international law experts pay attention to the derogation provisions of human rights treaties that permits governments to suspend their treaty obligations under certain conditions. The derogation clauses provide room for state parties to human rights treaties to cope with national emergency situations such as COVID-19 without being labeled a human right offender. While quite a number of states have invoked the derogation clauses, it is still true that many countries implemented right restrictive emergency measures without invoking the clauses. However, the key effect of the derogation that allows the treaty mechanism and other state parties to monitor the suspension of the member states' human rights treaty obligations becomes ever more valuable in the midst of global emergency like COVID-19.

Keywords: COVID-19, human rights, national emergency  
international human rights treaties, derogation

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## **The Complex Peace Theory on the Korean Peninsula: For the Mutual Connection of Driving Forces of Peace**

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Woen Sick Kim

The purpose of this study is to present the need for complex interconnection of driving forces of peace for the establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula in terms of peace theory. To this end, Kant's plan for eternal peace between countries was first interpreted as an attempt to present complex driving forces of peace between countries. And based on this, we shed light on the fundamental limitations of existing liberal approaches for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Here, it was pointed out that the existing liberal approaches have been limited to one-sided driving forces of peace such as market interdependence, democratization of the political system, identity change. Next, based on these considerations, the complex peace theory on the Korean Peninsula was proposed. Its key point is that multidimensional and complex approaches and cooperation to resolve mutual security vulnerabilities between the two Koreas are inevitable in order to build peace in the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. Without multidimensional and complex approaches for △ Resolving military threats through mutual cooperation △ Democratic representation of citizens' willingness to peace △ Strengthening interdependence through the market △ Resolving hostile identity, it is difficult to expect a smooth progress of the peace-building process on the Korean Peninsula. Lastly, with this situation in mind, it was emphasized that for the complex interconnection of driving forces of peace first, a gradual and step-by-step approach from a long-term perspective is necessary, and second, securing a virtuous cycle relation between driving forces of peace is paramount.

Keywords: peace on the Korean Peninsula, virtuous cycle relations, driving forces of peace, complex peace, step-by-step approach



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**The 8th Congress in Worker's Party of Korea and  
North Korean Politics:  
Governing Ideology, Strategic Lines, and Power Structure**

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Il-Gi Kim  
Ho-Hong Kim

This research report analyzes the political changes in North Korea after the 8th Congress with the frameworks of the governing ideology, strategic lines, and power structure. Also, it suggests evaluation and prospects on North Korean politics. Changes in North Korean politics have the following distinct features. First, the governing ideology appeared as a continuation of the guiding ideology, a revision in the fundamental political schemes of socialism, erasing the traces of ‘first military,’ strategy, a re-emergence of the communist terms, and a revision of the ‘five major ideological education.’ Second, the strategic line shows the characteristics of continuing, reinforcing, and rearranging the ‘route for concentrating all efforts on economic construction’ while continuing the strategy toward South Korea using strengthening national defense capabilities as a means of diplomatic achievements and expanding the united front. Third, the power structure showed the strengthening of Kim Jong-un’s monolithic leadership system, establishing a state management system centered on the Workers’ Party of Korea, unification of the party’s central leadership organization, and operational efficiency. Therefore, after the 8th Party Congress, we can evaluate that North Korean politics set the immediate goal of stabilizing the system to overcome the triple crises. North Korea promoted economic development and government stabilization for regime stabilization. Also, North Korea established the Worker’s Party-centered state management system with political support for this purpose. Therefore, the analyses and evaluation of North Korean politics present prospects: First, North Korea will continue holding meetings with the Worker’s Party of Korea and national organizations to implement the “Five-Year Economic Development Plan” successfully. Second, North Korea



will probably have frequent personnel appointments for executives concerning economic performance and prevention of COVID-19. Third, North Korea is likely to change its guiding ideology from ‘Kim Il-sungism and Kim Jong-ilism’ to ‘Kim Jong-unism.’ Fourth, North Korea will likely reorganize the national organization to strengthen the Kim Jong-un monolithic leadership system. Fifth, North Korea will continue to secure the initiative in inter-Korean relations based on its national defense capabilities. Lastly, Although North Korea’s revolutionary strategy toward South Korea will continue, inter-Korean relations are likely to progress through changes in South Korean policies.

Keywords: North Korea, Congress in Worker’s Party of Korea,  
Governing Ideology, Strategic Lines, Power Structure

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## Intelligence Powerhouse Strategy of Korea

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Kim, Il-Gi  
Oh, Il-Seok

This research report presents Korea's intelligence power-house strategy that can respond to the new security environment and changes in the national intelligence paradigm in the era of the 4th industrial revolution. The leap into an intelligence powerhouse cannot be achieved overnight, and it can only be achieved through a long-term vision, goal, and practical implementation process. The road to an intelligence powerhouse may be a tough one that has never been taken so far, and in the process, it may require a change of thinking and creative destruction that boldly deviate from the stereotypes of existing intelligence activities. This report is organized as follows in order to present Korea's intelligence powerhouse strategy. First, it examined the changes in the internal and external security environments during the era of the 4th industrial revolution, and it discussed the need for a groundbreaking shift in the intelligence activity paradigm to effectively and preemptively respond to security changes. Second, we examined and assessed the current state of national intelligence in Korea to present Korea's intelligence powerhouse strategy. We divided the current state of national intelligence into national intelligence capabilities, management and operation systems, and infrastructure, conducting an objective and realistic evaluation. Third, we presented "an advanced intelligence agency that leads the world and the future as a forerunner of national security" as Korea's vision for an intelligence powerhouse, suggesting three options for achieving the goals. The three paths to becoming an intelligence powerhouse are strengthening national intelligence capabilities, advancing national intelligence management and operations, and expanding and strengthening national intelligence infrastructure. The success or failure of intelligence can be seen as

determining the rise or fall of a country. History shows that national intelligence was accompanied by the regret and glory of the Roman Empire, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States and China, which are now called the G-2. We expect that this study will contribute to the development of Korea's national intelligence and to the path of its enhancing world's best intelligence powerhouse, and furthermore, achieving its security and prosperity.

Keywords: National security, National intelligence, intelligence powerhouse, intelligence community, intelligence paradigm

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## North Korea's Response to COVID-19: Perception, System, Behavior

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Kim, Ho-Hong  
Kim, Il-Gi

The COVID-19 incident has a profound impact on total human life globally. North Korea is no exception. In response to the COVID-19 incident, North Korea has been responding unusually actively and strongly, closing its borders for a long time, and President of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Kim Jong-un has been playing the role of a control tower by frequently operating top policy-making organizations, including the Party Congress. North Korea recognizes the COVID-19 incident as a serious security crisis at the national level beyond just a normal incident. On the basis of this perception, the national emergency quarantine system was quickly in operation immediately after the outbreak, and the legal system was reorganized, including the revision of the Infectious Disease Prevention Act and the enactment of the Emergency Disease Control Act. Organizations at various levels of the central and local governments are closely linked to mobilize all national capabilities for quarantine activities, while the Rodong Sinmun and other media outlets are strengthening hygiene and quarantine-related propaganda and education activities to residents. North Korea still maintains that there are no confirmed cases, and Chairman Kim Jong-un has been encouraging thorough quarantine until recently. The COVID-19 incident had a great impact on North Korea both internally and externally. The trade with China has plummeted due to a long-term border blockade, hurting the people's economy, and externally acting as an obstacle to carrying out a head-on war that was declared against international sanctions toward North Korea. The COVID-19 incident, along with sanctions and natural disasters against North Korea, could be a factor in deepening instability of the Kim Jong-un regime and undermining Kim Jong-un's leadership in state administration by adding

difficulties to people's lives. In this respect, it is necessary to strengthen the capabilities of information and policies so that they can prepare for and respond to the actions of identifying the internal situation and creating tensions in North Korea. Meanwhile, as the COVID-19 incident served as an important opportunity to confirm the necessity and importance of health cooperation between south and north Korea, it should be actively used as a momentum for the development of inter-Korean relations. While seeking various support measures for the rehabilitation of the people's economy and the resolution of residents' life problems, it is necessary to implement the agreed health cooperation project. In particular, considering the nature of cross-border infectious diseases and the increase in demand for North Korea's external cooperation due to the prolonged COVID-19, it is necessary to create a multilateral health cooperation community and promote North Korea's participation.

Keywords: COVID-19, emergency quarantine system,  
new security crisis, infectious disease inter-Korean cooperation

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## China's Space Power Development in the Era of the US-China Competition

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Park, Byung-Kwang

The most important starting point of this study is that “the 21st century is the era of space competition”. And today, the countries with the fiercest competition in space are China and the United States. In the 21st century, the space is called the ‘fourth battle field’ for modern warfare, and the importance of space is increasing on the national security. The purpose of this research report is to understand the background and aspects of China’s space development and the trend of strengthening space security capabilities, and by examining the US perception and counter strategy. The Chinese leadership believes that the source of the unipolar domination by the United States is military and intelligence power using space. Therefore, as long as China’s dream of becoming a great power does not disappear, internally, interest and aspirations for the development of space power will inevitably increase. However, the U.S. leadership, who is looking at China’s space development, has a growing sense of crisis that its dominance in space, which has been ahead of China, is gradually weakening. The United States feels anxious that the US could fall behind China in important areas of space development, including commercial and military security, as well as space science and technology. As a result, the United States is pursuing the space strategy goal of creating a Space Force to counter China, not excluding the use of force in space, and blocking access to space for hostile countries. Meanwhile, China’s space power development and militarization of space have a strategic impact not only on the United States but also on neighboring countries. In May 2020, Japan established a space unit under the name of ‘Space Operations Team’ under the Air Self-Defense Force, India also established and is operating the ‘Aerospace Command’ to counter China, and Russia has been operating the

Aerospace Force. In order to actively cope with changes in the international security order centered on the development of space power and to enhance its own national security capabilities, it is necessary for Korea also to establish an effective space strategy and space power system. In order for the South Korean military to cope with the new warfare of the 21st century, and to respond to North Korea's nuclear development and security threats from neighboring countries, it must develop its own space strategy and promote the construction of space power its own national security capabilities, it is necessary for Korea also to establish an effective space strategy and space power system. In order for the South Korean military to cope with the new warfare of the 21st century, and to respond to North Korea's nuclear development and security threats from neighboring countries, it must develop its own space strategy and promote the construction of space power.

Keywords: space power, space security, space military power, space competition, space force



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## **Kim Jong Un's Ruling Plan and His Reorganization of North Korean Political Power Structure**

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Zeno Ahn  
Su Seok Lee

The purpose of this study is to analyze how Kim Jong Un has tried to change the power structure of North Korea through revisions in Korean Worker's Party (KWP) rules and various regulations by setting his era. To this end, it mainly examines changes in the power structure of North Korea since Kim Jong Un took power in 2012 as the successor of Kim Jong Il, focusing on the KWP and state apparatuses (National Defense Commission, State Council, etc.). This study also analyzes Kim Jong Un's ruling plans that have been reflected in various information sources such as New Year speeches, various official remarks, and testimonies of high-level North Korean defectors. This study covers not only the North Korean political power structure itself but also the North Korean-style national vision that Kim Jong Un thought of, and analyzes the cases of socialist countries and those of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il era for distinguishing differences and similarities. Through answering following questions, this study tries to prospect for the stability of Kim Jong Un's power and the possibility of future power structure reorganization and political changes: How has Kim Jong-un established his political status within the KWP and the state's apparatus since taking power? What does Kim Jong Un's political choice mean, being compared to the universality of general socialist countries? As a result, how has the level of power concentration to Kim Jong Un changed? Which political calculations worked on Kim Jong Un's change in power structure, and what kind of North Korea has Kim Jong-un wanted to create? In the end, political outcomes that Kim Jong-un's choice will make in the future (is there a possibility of sustainability) are fundamental questions of the study. Under these

research objectives, this study draws various aspects of North Korean politics. Chapter 2 deals with power structures of socialist states and North Korea's distinctiveness, Chapter 3 identifies changes of North Korean power structures and determinants, and Chapter 4 analyzes the implications of Kim Jong Un's ruling plans that has intervened -- and will intervene -- in North Korea's political changes.

Keywords: Socialism, North Korean politics, power structures of North Korea, Kim Jong Un's ruling plan, North Korean-style national vision

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## Study on Fundamental Factors and Diffusion Mechanism of Anti-Korean Sentiment in China and Japan

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Gabyong Yang

There are various factors of cooperation and unfriendly factors in the relationship with China and Japan such as nationalism, sentimental influences, policy factors. In this study, through comparative study with China and Japan, the historical context, the origin and the trigger factors of anti-Korean sentiment are analyzed and based on the following factors, a response strategy is devised. First of all, we focused on the self identity, nationalism and media factors as the major fundamental factors of anti-Korean sentiment in two countries. Japan's anti-Korean trigger factors are perception of identity, sense of crisis in narrowing the gap, *tatemaie*(建前, justification), and internal-oriented political culture; while China's anti-Korean sentiment is triggered by national supremacy, extension of national power, internalized self-consciousness, and monopoly of propaganda and public opinion. The similarities of two countries in the spread of anti-Korean sentiment are nationalist sentiment, self-consciousness and utilizing media. Meanwhile, the differences are the perception of the growth of Korea and the way of vigilant, and the way of expressing self-consciousness and political culture. The anti-Korean sentiment of two countries appears as the combination of militarism, historicism, culturalism, and patriotism based on nationalism respectively. As much as the two countries, Korea's perception of China and Japan is deteriorating. The implication is that the three countries which share through nationalism. Our response strategies include sharing a common project, reconsidering the role of media, the spread of universal consensus among mankind. In order to achieve this, discussing on cooperation of three countries to build consensus, building a feasible business model, establishing a cooperation platform, completing laws and systems, developing sustainable cooperative agendas are needed. In conclusion, all three countries should lower the volatility of nationalism, and start to build consensus by wary it to move to exclusive nationalism or excessive nationalism.

Keywords: sentiment, hate Korea, anti-Korean, identity, national power, China, Japan

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## Propose Practical Agendas for “Northeast Asian Quarantine Cooperation Institutionalization”

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Oh, Il-Seok  
JANG, SE HO

In his keynote speech at the 75th U.N. General Assembly on September 22, 2020, President Moon Jae In proposed the Northeast Asian Health Cooperation, including North Korea, Japan, Mongolia and South Korea. Since then, on December 29, 2020, the “Northeast Asia Cooperation for Health Security” has been established through the first working-level video conference attended by six countries in the region. However, the Cooperation is limited by the lack of binding regulations such as agreements and protocols, as it is a mere conference without specific budget or funding for implementing the initiatives, and no secretariat. Under COVID-19 circumstance Global Health Security Agenda(GHSA), led by the U.S and the European Union’s ECDC have promoted diverse initiatives to response the infectious diseases. Following these cooperative initiatives, it is necessary to “institutionalize” the Northeast Asia Cooperation for Health Security. In order to institutionalize the activities of the Cooperation, it is necessary to establish sustainability and forceability of the cooperation with strengthen awareness of the policymakers and people, and with the Northeast regional cooperation following the quarantine process. On the other hand, considering the U.S.-China competition and the conflicting interests of the two Koreas, Japan and Russia, it is difficult to establish a “the Northeast Asia Cooperation for Health Security” in a sustainable and binding manner. Based on the Cooperation, a system should be established, stage by stage, to detect, prevent, respond to, and recover new infectious diseases in Northeast Asia. In particular, the situation of COVID 19 and North Korea’s participation should be considered in each stage. On the other hand, it is necessary to divide the participating countries into official members and observers, so that North Korea can

participate as observers first. Based on this, it is necessary to consider ways to urge North Korea to join as an official member. In order to institutionalize “the Northeast Asia Cooperation for Health Security” it is necessary to take into account the process of responding to infectious diseases. First of all, a “Infectious Diseases Information Sharing System” in the Northeast Asia shall be established to detect and prevent infectious diseases. In this stage, an infectious disease monitoring system using ICT technology shall be established, and sharing health and medical information shall also be established. In this stage a “Northeast Asian Quarantine Information System” and “Early Warning Response System” shall be established. With these Systems the Epidemic Risk Assessment shall be performed. In the second stage, a “Infectious Disease Responding System” in the Northeast Asia shall be established. In the second stage, capacity building in testing, treatment, tracking, and isolation of the confirmed cases shall be developed. A “Northeast Asian Epidemiological Experts Group”, a “Northeast Asian Centers for Disease Control and Management”, and Vaccines Cooperation Community shall also be established. Finally, in the third stage a “Infectious Disease Crisis Management System” shall be institutionalized. Under the system, states in the region jointly respond to regional threats to emerging infectious diseases. Governance to respond infectious disease with crisis management should be established and budgeted, “Infectious Disease Response Strategy” should be established and implemented, and “Infectious Disease Responding Clusters” in border areas should be established. The environmental situations which would be vulnerable for infectious Disease and infrastructures should be also improved. The “Infectious Diseases Information Sharing System”, “Infectious Disease Responding System”, and “Infectious Disease Crisis Management System” shall be institutionalized stage by stage. It will guarantee the health rights of residents of Northeast Asia, establish free access to the medical system, and gradually form a health security community where people are safe from infectious diseases. Institutionalizing the “Northeast Asia

Cooperation for Health Security” would protect the survival of local residents, revitalize the regional economy, ensure stability and peace in the region, and achieve a balance of people, prosperity and peace. As a concrete way to expand Korea’s diplomatic and security strategies and to play a practical role as a bridge country, the institutionalizing is expected to demonstrate “growth through people” for regional countries based on Korea’s advanced digital technology.

Keywords: Institutionalizing the Northeast Asia Cooperation for Health Security, GHSA, ECDC, Infectious Diseases Information Sharing System, Infectious Disease Responding System, and Infectious Disease Crisis Management System, Infectious Disease Responding Clusters in border areas, bridge country, growth through people

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## Geo-Economic Competition between the U.S. and China in Southeast Asia: Current Status and Prospects

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Yoo, Hyun-Chung

The purpose of this study is to analyze the current status of geoeconomic competition between the U.S. and China in Southeast Asia and predict future developments to derive implications for the Indo-Pacific regional order and implications for the Korean government. Due to the economic development of Southeast Asian countries and geopolitical factors as a strategic hub, Southeast Asia has become a major stage in the hegemony competition between the U.S.-China powers. Not only the geopolitical confrontation between the U.S. and China over the South China Sea, but also the geoeconomic confrontation between the U.S. and China has recently intensified in Southeast Asia. For example, the global supply chain is rapidly reorganizing through the U.S.-China trade war and pandemic, and the Biden administration, which was launched in January this year, is focusing on geoeconomic competition called “supply chain competition” as a way to restore leadership in the region and check China. China has been actively developing “vaccine diplomacy” targeting Southeast Asian countries and is expected to expand OBOR capital investment in Southeast Asian countries that need enormous funds for the post-COVID19 economic recovery. Competition between the U.S. and China in Southeast Asia is expected to be more pronounced in the geoeconomic domain in the future, coupled with economic demands from regional countries seeking economic recovery and strategic demands of U.S.-China leadership competition. First of all, in the trade and trade sector, there is no significant change in the U.S. regional trade and trade strategies over the next year. The Biden administration is expected to focus more on recovering the domestic economy with worker-centered economic policies rather than global trade agreements such as CPTPP. Ahead of next year’s general elections, it is unlikely that both Democratic and Republican parties will actively engage in multilateral trade agreements that could affect the position of their workers. Rather than huge trade agreements such as trade agreements, regional strategies are expected to be implemented through



economic cooperation by sector such as infrastructure and high-tech. The U.S. administration believes that advanced science and technology such as 5G, quantum computing, and high-tech batteries are strategic industries that measure victory or defeat in the hegemony competition with China. Accordingly, U.S. will make efforts to curb China's influence on science and technology. In the infrastructure sector, geoeconomic competition is expected in the soft infrastructure sector such as communication network connectivity rather than hard infrastructure such as roads and railroads. In the high-tech science and technology sector, it will expand its influence in the region by promoting talent training, technology transfer, and science and technology complex construction. Amid fierce competition between the U.S. and China to build a nation-centered infrastructure and science and technology supply chain in Southeast Asia, overheating geological competition between the U.S. and China will bring about a major change in regional order. The U.S. and China are likely to force regional countries to choose their own supply chains by rapidly attempting decoupling supply chains in major core industries. The choice of choosing between the two is to increase the political and economic burden on Southeast Asian countries that maintain a neutral non-alliance route. Accordingly, Southeast Asian countries will try to find alternatives other than the U.S.-China. Among them, Japan and the EU could emerge as new major partners. In preparation for the changing regional economic environment, the Korean government should also respond strategically. First, it is necessary to check our core supply chain and establish a diversified and stable supply chain policy despite uncertainties in the external economy. In addition, efforts should be made to diversify the profitstructure from Southeast Asian countries by steadily supplementing and revising the New Southern Policy. Plus promoted by the current government. In addition, in the process of reorganizing the global supply chain, we will have to actively foster the semiconductor sector, which has a comparative advantage, to lead the global semiconductor supply chain.

Keywords: Geological competition between the U.S. and China, Southeast Asia, the U.S. Innovation & Competition Act, One Belt One Road Initiative, digital silk road initiative, CPTPP

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## Political Dynamics of Changing the Path of North Korea's External and South Korean Strategies

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Su Seok Lee

Zeno Ahn

The purpose of this article is to examine the main points and factors of change in North Korea's foreign policy and inter-Korean policy from the establishment of the regime to the time of Kim Jong-un's current regime. To this end, this study analyzes North Korea's external and strategies against South Korean and analyzes the external and strategies against South Korean of the Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il regimes through motives, internal and external environments, and major power dynamics to find out the main factors of route change. In particular, we will examine what kind of power dynamics occurred within North Korea in the process of changing the route and whether there was a power conflict or policy conflict. The first time of change routes was when North Korea developed equidistant diplomacy and Juche diplomacy during the mid-1950s due to Sino-Soviet disputes and changes in routes during the Cold War. Second, the timing of the route change includes the signing of a basic inter-Korean greement in the early 1990s, the Geneva Agreement between North America and the United States, and the time of Kim Il-sung's death in 1994. The third turning point is the inter-Korean summit in the early 2000s, the emergence of the US Bush administration, the nuclear crisis in the mid-2000s, the six-way talks, and the September 19 Joint Statement, and North Korea's full-fledged nuclear development period. The fourth transition period is from 2012 to the 7th Party Conference, the period of Kim Jong-un's reign, to the 6th nuclear test in 2017. The fifth time of change routes is the major events that occurred before and after the 2018 inter-Korean summit, the Singapore-North American summit, and the 2019 Hanoi-North American summit, and the subsequent route change. At each of these times of path transition, it is estimated that there were internal discussions and dynamic changes in power relations within North Korea in any form, and the change in power structure and internal power dynamics are considered.

Keywords: path change, power conflict, power structure change,  
foreign policy, policy toward South Korea

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**Political Dynamics of Change in North Korea's Economic Strategy:  
Ideology, Conflict of Interests, and Economic Policy**

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Lim Soo-Ho

This study tries to infer the political dynamics that worked in the process of forming and transforming North Korea's economic strategy. It is the process of establishing the 'heavy industry priority line' in the power struggle with the pro-USSR and pro-China faction, the 'economy-defense parallel line' in the policy struggle with the Gapsan faction, the compartmentalization of the economy and the creation of a privileged economy in the process of power succession of Kim Jong-il; And after the Cold War, it was a process of conflicts of bureaucratic interests in which attempts to constrain the privileged economy and opposition to them collide. In socialist states, economic strategy is called capital accumulation strategy, and it consists of 'investment priority issue' and 'investment source issue.' The heavy industry priority line and the economy-defense parallel line are related to the former, and the process of their formation is closely related to the process of establishing the 'Great Leader System' in North Korea. Therefore, these two lines belong to the realm of ideology that cannot be changed, and they are 'mother lines' that continue to exert strong influences even now. The 'real' focus of the revolutionary economic strategy, the military-first economic line, the economic-nuclear parallel line, and the concentration of powers into the economic growth line, which have emerged and disappeared in the post-Cold War era, was to realign the sources of investment, though they used the 'cover' of investment priorities issue. They attempted to restrict the privileged economy and readjust the bureaucratic balance of interests favored it, formed in the process of Kim Jong-il's power succession in the 1970s and 1980s, and the results of reactions against those attempts. Recently, the concentration of powers into the economic growth line has disappeared in North Korea's official discourse, and it was confirmed that the

economic-nuclear parallel line was abolished at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021. However, the critical mind of two policies is still continuing through horizontal re-centralization attempts to restrict the privileged economy. If the economic difficulties are alleviated in the future, North Korea will present a new strategic line. However, whatever strategic line is adopted, it is not an attempt to readjust the priorities of resource allocation, but rather an attempt to readjust the source of investment or a product of a conflict of bureaucratic interests triggered by the oppositions. Due to the nature of the North Korean system, there will be no reform or counter-reform attempts in the resource allocation priorities that have already been promoted to the realm of ideology.

Keywords: strategic economic line, strategy of capital accumulation, ideologization of policy, institutionalization of policy, bureaucratic conflict of interests, vertical policy winning coalition

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## U.S.-Russia Relations After the Inauguration of the Biden Administration: Politics and Security Aspects

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JANG, Seho

About a year has passed since the Biden administration was launched, and bilateral relations between the U.S. and Russia are developing under tight tensions. The following factors have had a major impact on the strained relationship between the two countries: Distrust that has continued to expand during the post-Cold War period, different perceptions and goals about the current international order and the alternative order, domestic political demand for “mutual demonization”, and private malice and distrust between the leaders of the two countries. Since the Biden administration took office, it is expected that the current stagnation and deterioration will continue rather than a breakthrough (‘Reset 2.0’) in bilateral relations. In the future, cooperation between the U.S. and Russia will take place in a “selective and limited” form, and is expected to materialize in some areas and issues. For this reason, it is judged that the possibility of a “new cold war” or “great decoupling” in bilateral relations is not high. Korea needs to consider the following points in relation to changes in the international order due to intensifying competition between the U.S. and China. First, it is necessary to use Ukraine’s experience as a teacher in the process of easing the Donbas crisis and agreeing on Nord Stream 2 between the U.S. and Germany. Second, attention should be paid to the importance of “the link of mutual dependence” in relations between countries. Third, it is necessary to pay attention to the strategic attitude taken by Germany to complete the “Nord Stream 2” project. In addition, Korea should seek to reevaluate and actively utilize Russia’s “strategic value”, consider the specificity of relations between the U.S. and Russia, and increase the density of relations rather than avoid conflicts.

Keywords: The U.S. Russia, Biden, Putin, Bilateral Relations

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## **The UK's Indo-Pacific Strategy: Historical Background and Strategic Intent**

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E.J.R. Cho

This study first examines why the UK, traditionally an Atlantic power, is expanding its Indo-Pacific strategic presence in the 21st century. Through various official documents, this study demonstrates that the UK government ostensibly cited economic opportunities, diplomatic approach towards China, preparedness for terrorism and disasters, and humanitarian activities as reasons for devoting its attention to the Indo-Pacific. However, it is difficult to understand the UK's attempt to redefine its role as an Indo-Pacific member by spending a massive proportion of its budget under a grand national strategy. As such, this study infers the UK's recent activities and motivations in the Indo-Pacific through its historical background and the changing international security environment. The UK had ample experience in colonising the Indo-Pacific regions to counter Russia's southward encroachment and gain resources and markets during the age of imperialism. Even now, more than seven decades after it took its hands off of the colonies, the UK has accumulated enough strategic assets by continuing military and economic exchanges with its overseas territories and former colonies in the Indo-Pacific based on the legacy of the imperial era. This legacy also contributed to the global domination of its close ally, the US. However, with the Obama administration's declaration of commencing on the "Pacific Century" in 2011, it became clear that the Atlantic powers could no longer become the centre of the world in the US's global strategy and that it was inevitable for the UK to make a major shift in its strategy. As a result, there have been major changes including post-Europeanism, the modernisation of ocean fleets, and strengthening solidarity with partner countries. Section 2 traces the historical origins of the

UK's Indo-Pacific strategy. Based on a review of the current situation, section 3 examines the dynamics of geostrategic cooperation and competition among allies particularly in the UK-US-Japan relations in terms of the process of geopolitical transformation. Lastly, this study investigates the expanding influence of maritime powers like the UK in the Indo-Pacific and its impact on the Korean peninsula and will conclude by proposing strategic countermeasures that Korea should take.

Keywords: Geopolitics, Indo-Pacific Strategy, Global Britain, Maritime Security, Brexit, UK, US, Japan



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## International Political Trends in Cybersecurity and Korea's Strategic Plan

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Chae, Jae-Byung

The purpose of this study is to devise and present our response strategies to such changes in cybersecurity by analyzing the international political trend of cybersecurity in the international community, and at the same time to predict changes in cybersecurity due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and cybersecurity in the post-corona era. Recently, the international community is entering a new normal era due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the competition for hegemony between the U.S. and China is intensifying. Cybersecurity is also changing significantly under the influence of this situation. Therefore, a review of these changes is required, and in particular, cybersecurity changes that will occur when the post-corona era arrives and a review for preparation for these changes is also required. To this end, first, to examine the international political meaning of cybersecurity as a basis for discussion, the international political perception of cyberspace, the security implications of cyber sovereignty and the relationship between cybersecurity, and the formation of international norms related to cybersecurity are analyzed. Next, in order to analyze the international political trend of cybersecurity, the development of cybersecurity amid the U.S.-China competition, changes in cyberattacks due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and prospects of changes in cybersecurity in the post-corona era are examined. Finally, based on this analysis, Korea's future cybersecurity-related strategic plans are derived and presented. It is necessary to provide monitoring, detection, blocking, and protection for the entire scope of cyberattacks, including networks and clouds, through the proposed strategies. In addition, it is necessary to respond to cyber threats in the post-corona era by improving the existing cyber attack response system to cover the expanded attack range due to the impact of COVID-19, and building a cyber security platform that can protect new vulnerabilities.

Keywords: cybersecurity, cyberspace, cyber sovereignty,  
COVID-19 pandemic, post-corona era

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## Korea's Security Situation Change and Wartime OPCON Transition Issues

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Choi, Yonghwan

The current Korean government has promised to carry out the Wartime Operational Control(OPCON) transition within its term, but due to various circumstances such as COVID-19, it seems impossible to carry out the Wartime OPCON transition within its term. Therefore, the debate over the Wartime OPCON transition is expected to continue for some time to come. So far, the debate over the Wartime OPCON transition has been about sovereignty and military efficiency. Opponents of the Wartime OPCON transition argue that Wartime OPCON transition began with the political logic of securing sovereignty and could undermine military practicality. On the other hand, those in favor of the Wartime OPCON transition say that the power of the South Korean military, excluding nuclear weapons, is already surpassing North Korea, and the problem of responding to North Korea's nuclear weapons is separate from the Wartime OPCON transition. In fact, the focus of discussions between Korea and the United States related to the Wartime OPCON transition was on the command system, and now two countries have agreed on the principle of Wartime OPCON transition based on conditions. In addition to military efficiency and sovereignty issues, this study examined the necessity of Wartime OPCON transition in terms of changes in Korea's security environment. First, it is worth noting that the possibility of a limited war increases after North Korea has nuclear weapons. The North Korean nuclear response should be responded at the level of the Korea-U.S. alliance, not the Wartime OPCON, and there is an aspect that requires Wartime OPCON transition to properly respond to the situation of the limited war. Second, the security should be considered. In that respect, this study analyzed issues related to Wartime OPCON transition in consideration of the changing security situation in Korea.trend of intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition should

be considered. Since both the U.S. and China interpret the Korean Peninsula issue in the framework of the U.S.-China conflict, it is necessary to secure policy flexibility between the two to protect Korea's national interests. Third, it is necessary to consider the interests of the United States, which wants its allies to bear a greater burden on its security. Looking back at the case of the reduction of USFK in the past, it can be seen that it was made regardless of Korea's interests according to the U.S. global strategy and judgment. Fourth, it is necessary to examine whether the focus of the Wartime OPCON transition capability verification is wrong. If the core of the war time OPCON transition is a change in the command system, the focus should be on verifying the command capabilities of Korean military generals, not the overall military capabilities. It is not known how the Wartime OPCON transition will proceed in the future. However, in addition to responding to North Korea's threats, it seems relatively clear that various aspects of change related to South Korea's security should be considered. In that respect, this study analyzed issues related to Wartime OPCON transition in consideration of the changing security situation in Korea.

Keywords: Wartime OPCON transition, ROK-US Alliance, changing security situation, USFK, UNC

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## Discussions and Implications for 'Strategic Autonomy' in EU

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Han, Seung Wan

In a situation where the international security environment is changing due to the rise of China and the US 'Pivot to Asia', the EU has launched a full-fledged discussion of 'strategic autonomy'. This discussion has gradually expanded beyond the realm of security and defense to various fields such as technology, environment, trade, finance, governance system, and international cooperation. In Chapter 1, this article analyzes the definition of Europe's concept of 'strategic autonomy' developed at various levels in various fields and the complex aspects and problems it faces. First of all, the concept is defined as 'the ability to autonomously choose and act on when and in which field to act with like-minded partners'. And it emphasizes that it does not pursue the extremes of 'self-sufficiency', but rather spreads European interests and values while managing interdependence in an aggressive competitive environment. Chapter 2 analyzes the direction and level of strategies and policies by selecting the area of security defense and digital technology as the main areas of action where strengthening 'strategic autonomy' is promoted. In the area of security and defense, it analyzes the controversy surrounding the EU's 'Permanent Security Cooperation (PESCO)' and the 'European Intervention Initiative' (EI2) led by France, and states that establishing a complementary relationship with NATO is the key. It then describes the principles and directions of establishing 'digital sovereignty' at the EU level and 'data sovereignty' led by Germany and France. Chapter 3 analyzes the EU's relations with the US and China in terms of cooperation and conflict in the context of intensifying global strategic competition between the US and China. The EU is trying to combine a 'value alliance' and a 'technology alliance' with the United States in the fields of high-tech and trade, while taking a reserved attitude toward an all-out confrontation with China. In relations with

China, it has been using the two-sided strategy of economic cooperation and compliance requirements, suggesting that there is a possibility of a change in China policy in a situation where the ‘change through trade’ policy did not bring the intended result. Finally, it is pointed out that it is worth noting that ‘autonomy’ or ‘sovereignty’ and ‘openness’ are not mutually opposed but mutually premised relationships in the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’. Accordingly, we propose to pursue ‘strategic autonomy’ in an open connectivity with partners, and to develop our capacity as an international ‘norm maker’ by actively participating in multilateral efforts in Europe

Keywords: EU, ‘Strategic Autonomy’, ‘Strategic Sovereignty’, NATO, EU-US Relation, EU-China Relation